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This study assesses how globalization modulates the effect of governance on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in sub‐Saharan African countries. The empirical evidence is based on Generalized Method of Moments. The minimum level (or negative threshold) of Foreign Direct Investment required for it to interact with political stability and contribute toward the green economy is 45 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while 90 percent of GDP is the maximum level (or positive threshold) required for trade to complement "voice and accountability" in mitigating CO2 emissions. Seventy‐six percent of GDP and 80 percent of GDP are, respectively, negative trade thresholds for government effectiveness and economic governance. The corresponding negative trade thresholds for the rule of law, corruption‐control, and institutional governance are, respectively, 230 percent of GDP, 63.5 percent of GDP, and 106.5 percent of GDP. Actionable openness policy thresholds are provided to inform policy makers on how governance interacts with globalization to promote the green economy.

This study assesses how globalization modulates the effect of governance on CO2 emissions in sub-Saharan African countries. The empirical evidence is based on Generalized Method of Moments. The minimum level (or negative threshold) of FDI required for it to interact with political stability and contribute towards the green economy is 45% of GDP, while 90% of GDP is the maximum level (or positive threshold) required for trade to complement "voice & accountability" in mitigating CO2 emissions. 76 % of GDP and 80 % of GDP are respectively negative trade thresholds for government effectiveness and economic governance. The corresponding negative trade thresholds for the rule of law, corruption-control and institutional governance are respectively, 230% of GDP, 63.5% of GDP and 106.5% of GDP. Actionable openness policy thresholds are provided to inform policy makers on how governance interacts with globalization to promote the green economy.

This study assesses the role of income levels (low and middle) in modulating governance (political and economic) to influence inclusive human development. The empirical evidence is based on interactive quantile regressions and forty-nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2002.The following main findings are established. First, low income modulates governance (economic and political) to positively affect inclusive human development exclusively in countries with above-median levels of inclusive human development. It follows that countries with averagely higher levels of inclusive human development are more likely to benefit from the relevance of income levels in influencing governance for inclusive development. Second, the importance of middle income in modulating political governance to positively affect inclusive human is apparent exclusively in the median while the relevance of middle income in moderating economic governance to positively influence inclusive human development is significantly apparent in the 10th and 75th quantiles. Third, regardless of panels, income levels modulate economic governance to affect inclusive human development at a higher magnitude, compared to political governance. Policy implications are discussed in the light of the post-2015 agenda of sustainable development goals and contemporary development paradigms. This study complements the extant sparse literature on the inclusive human development in Africa.

The study examines the use of governance tools to fight capital flight by reducing the capital flight trap. Two overarching policy syndromes are addressed in the study. It first assesses whether governance is an effective deterrent to the capital flight trap in Africa, before examining what thresholds of government quality are required to fight the capital flight trap in the continent. The following findings are established. Evidence of a capital flight trap is apparent because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values of capital flight. The net effects from interactions of the capital flight trap with political stability, regulation quality, economic governance and corruption-control on capital flight are positive. The critical masses at which "voice & accountability" and regulation quality can complement the capital flight trap to reduce capital flight are respectively, 0.120 and 0.680, which correspond to the best performing countries. Policy implications are discussed.

This article contributes to the attendant literature by bundling governance dynamics and focusing on foreign aid instability instead of foreign aid. We assess the role of foreign aid instability on governance dynamics in 53 African countries for the period 1996‐2010. An autoregressive endogeneity‐robust generalized method of moments is employed. Instabilities are measured in terms of variance of the errors and standard deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, namely: total aid, aid from multilateral donors, and bilateral aid. Principal component analysis is used to bundle governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice and accountability and political stability/no violence), economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of law and corruption control), and general governance (political, economic, and institutional governance). Our findings show that foreign aid instability increases governance standards, especially political and general governance. Policy implications are discussed.Related ArticlesBeal, Amanda L., and Leah Graham. 2014. "Foundations for Change: Rule of Law, Development, and Democratization." Politics & Policy 42 (3): 311‐345. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12077Fails, Matthew D. 2014. "Leader Turnover, Volatility, and Political Risk." Politics & Policy 42 (3): 369‐399. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12078Jakubow, Alexander. 2014. "State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation." Politics & Policy 42 (1): 3‐36. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12057

The EMU crisis holds special lessons for existing monetary unions. We assess the behavior of real effective exchange rates (REERs) of members of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) zone with respect to their long-term equilibrium paths. A reduced form of the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) model is estimated and associated misalignments. Our findings suggest that for majority of countries, macroeconomic fundamentals have the expected associations with the exchange rate fluctuations. The analysis also reveals that only the REER adjustments of Cameroon and Gabon are significant in restoring the long-term equilibrium in event of a shock. The Cameroonian economic fundamentals of terms of trade, government expenditure and openness have different long-term relations with the REER in comparison to those of other member states. There is no need for an adjustment in the level of the peg based on the present quantitative analysis of REER paths.

This study investigates the determinants of and persistence in access to weapons using a global sample of 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Hysteresis in access to weapons is consistently more apparent in countries with below-median levels in access to weapons, compared to their counterparts with above-median levels in access to weapons. The hysteresis hypothesis within this context is the propensity of past values of access to weapons to influence future values of access to weapons. Factors that consistently drive access to weapons are: perceptions of crime; criminality; conflict intensity; political instability; military expenditure, violent demonstrations and terrorism. The effects of these drivers are contingent on initial levels of access to weapons. Policy recommendations for managing access to weapons are discussed.

This study contributes to the attendant literature by bundling governance dynamics and focusing on foreign aid instability instead of foreign aid. We assess the role of foreign aid instabilit y on governance dynamics in fifty three African countries for the period 1996-2010. An autoregressive endogeneity-robust Generalized Method of Moments is employed. Instabilities are measured in terms of variance of the errors and standard deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, namely: total aid, aid from multilateral donors and bilateral aid. Principal Component Analysis is used to bundle governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice & accountability a nd political stability/no violence), economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of law and corruption-control) and general governance (political, economic and institutional governance). Our findings show that foreign aid instability increases governance standards, especially political and general governance. Poli cy implications are discussed.

Motivated by evidence that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa, the study contributes to the literature on reinventing foreign aid by assessing if development assistance can sustain inclusive human development. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries with data for the period 2005-2012 and Generalised Method of Moments. The adopted foreign aid variables include: aid for social infrastructure, aid for economic infrastructure, aid to the productive sector, aid to the multi sector, programme assistance, action on debt and humanitarian assistance. The results reveal that whereas foreign aid improves inclusive human development in the short-run, it decreases it in the long term. Policy implications are discussed with particular emphasis on reinventing foreign aid for sustainable development in the post-2015 development agenda.